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In Italy social enterprises include more than 7,000 institutions with around 250,000 workers 
serving more than three million people, a big share of which disadvantaged. Using the ICSI 
2007 survey conducted by a pool of Italian universities on a representative sample of social 
enterprises, we analyze the determinants of nominal and real wages (adjusted for the cost of 
living in the area of residence). Our two main findings show that: i) low wages and absence 
of “direct” education premia make it hard to attract (beyond intrinsic motivations) young 
talented workers in this sector even though indirect premia in terms of higher probability of 
becoming manager exist; ii)  cooperative wage differentials are sensitive to regional 
disparities in PPP even though they do not fully compensate for them: nominal wages are 
higher in Northern Italy but, after adjusting for the cost of living, they become higher in the 
South.  
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According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT, 2008), on the 31
st of 
December 2005 there were in Italy 7,363 social enterprises hiring 244,223 workers (plus 
34,626 volunteers), serving more than 3,300,000 people and producing goods and services 
for 6.4 billion €. Social enterprises can be either of “type A”, the most widespread which 
provide assistance to the elderly and education services to the children, or of “type B”, 
which deal with work integration of disadvantaged people (mentally and physically disabled, 
previous drug addicted, ex prisoners, etc.).  
 
As a result of growing government debts, shirking public expenditures and increasing 
demand of the ageing population, the number of enterprises, of people actively involved and 
of beneficiaries has constantly grown. More than 70% of social enterprises were born after 
1991. In only two years, from 2003 to 2005, the number of enterprises increased by 19.5%, 
that of workers by 26.2%, and the value of the goods and services provided by 32.2% (in 
constant 2005 terms).  
 
Social enterprises are not-for-profit organizations which either provide assistance to selected 
categories of individuals or provide goods and services by reintegrating disadvantaged people 
who often have low productivity. As a consequence, this sector is not particularly “wealthy” 
and cannot pay very high salaries. Furthermore, social enterprises face a trade-off between 
increasing workers’ salaries and providing assistance and services to the largest number of 
individuals. Therefore, to some extent, it is understandable that they end up trading off some 
Euros in the pay-pockets of employees and managers in exchange of benefits for their 
beneficiaries.  
 
However, another important reason for low salaries in Italian social enterprises seems to be 
that, due to the economic stagnation and high indebtedness of the Italian Government over 
the last twenty years, public authorities increasingly choose to externalize the provision of 
social services through auctions whose target is to maximize the rebate and minimize the 
costs. This, in turn, generates a strong competition among participants to the auctions and a 
negative effect on workers’ salaries and labor conditions
1. Workers of social enterprises and 
employees belonging to the public institutions which delegate (part of) the services 
frequently do the same identical job, the latter having a lower salary and short-term and 
unstable contracts with respect to the first. To sum up, in order to survive, social enterprises 
most often need to sign contracts with public authorities, which is achieved by offering 
rebates in the auctions, which in turn is made possible by cutting salaries.  
 
 
                                                 
1 In a recent (unpublished) investigation on the regulatory policies of the so called “third sector” in Piedmont 
Marocchi et al. (2009) show that 30% of social enterprises selected through auctions by the public authorities 
were chosen exclusively or mainly on the basis of the lowest price criterion. Furthermore, two thirds of auction 
participants did not consider the starting prices as adequate. The authors conclude that, despite of the 
progresses made in both regulation and tendering exercises, bad commissioning still persists, with low bid as an 
important selection mechanism, denial of labour cost recovery and unnecessary short-term contracts. “This 
means an insufficient consideration of the minimum standards guaranteeing the quality of services and a fair 
workers’ remuneration”.   3
Given these original characteristics, the goal of our paper is to investigate the determinants 
of sector wage differentials in social enterprises to verify whether the above mentioned 
specificities may generate differences with respect to the wage pattern observed in the profit 
sector. The main issue at stake is related to the downward pressure of the above mentioned 
factors on wages and to the effective capacity of this sector to remunerate talent. 
 
In fact, low salaries might represent a problem for social enterprises which could end up 
recruiting individuals with lower talent, skills or willingness to work hard. The literature on 
gift exchange (Akerlof, 1982), shows that workers modify their behavior according to what 
they have received from the employer, thereby putting more effort if they feel they have 
received a fair wage (Rabin, 1998). Thus, by paying low salaries in order to save money, 
social enterprises might recruit a higher number of workers with lower productivity, the final 
result being uncertain: it might eventually be negative if savings from lower salaries were 
smaller than the fall in productivity. 
 
As a partial compensation to this possible vicious circle it must be taken into account that, in 
economic transactions, effort and behavior depend not only on extrinsic but also on intrinsic 
motivations. 
2 While the first are of economic kind, based on rewards and punishments, the 
second are of psychological type, based on the agent’s moral values, ideals, interest in the 
activity, desire to perform well, need of prestige, personal involvement and convincement 
over the social relevance of the activity undertaken.  
 
As noted by Hansmann (1980) and Handy and Katz (1998), nonprofit employers might offer 
salaries below those of the for-profit sector in order to self-select the applicants with higher 
intrinsic motivations. Mosca, Musella and Pastore (2007) build a theoretical setting where 
effort correlates with both monetary and non-monetary compensations. Using data on a 
sample of Italian non-profit enterprises the authors show that, by allowing higher non-
pecuniary compensations, non-profit enterprises attract workers with similar skills and 
higher intrinsic motivations, which end up providing a higher level of effort with respect to 
profit organizations. As in non-profit organizations, also in social enterprises intrinsic 
motivations might compensate for the low wages paid to workers.  
 
However, if wages and career paths are not subject to fair and effective incentive 
mechanisms (e.g. there are gender wage gaps or there is no educational wage premium), then 
intrinsic motivations might be insufficient to compensate for the low wages and social 
enterprises might face a decrease in the average quality of the job applicants or in their 
effort. Workers’ motivations depend on many factors, among which wage equity, work 
morale and group cohesiveness play an important role: “the perception of wage fairness or 
equity is generally understood to be based on the extent to which differences in wages 
between an individual and the relevant reference group are considered to be justified” (Leete, 
2000, p. 425). Thus, wage dispersion would reduce work morale (Stark, 1990), job 
satisfaction (Clark and Oswald, 1996) and group cohesiveness (Levine, 1991).  
                                                 
2 The original definition of intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971) states that: ‘one is said to be intrinsically motivated 
to perform an activity when he receives no apparent reward except the activity itself’.  Prendergast (2007) 
applies the concept when interpreting the working effort of bureaucrats which have weak monetary incentives 
but nonetheless perform their jobs because their care about their outcomes.  
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On the other hand, as noted by Lazear (1991), wage inequity does not automatically imply a 
loss of motivation or productivity since competition among workers might generate 
efficiency gains. The perception of fairness diminishes if salaries are too different (high 
dispersion), but also if talent and effort are not properly rewarded (in case of gender wage 
differentials, no educational wage premium, etc.). Similarly, long periods without receiving 
any promotion lead to a fall in intrinsic motivations (Van Herpen et al., 2006), which 
becomes even more severe if this is not due to lack of talent or effort. 
 
The recent history of social enterprises confirms the worries of wage theories when applied 
to characteristics of social enterprises’ wages. Over the last years Italian employees of social 
enterprises have been complaining about salaries, working conditions and criteria used for 
the career paths. After 27 months since the previous national workers’ contract expired, on 
the 4
th of April 2008 the labor unions organized a national strike which, according to the 
promoters, had an 80% participation rate.  
 
The unions requests were: (i) a salary increase of 80 up to 110 € per month, according to the 
type of job; (ii) a compensation for the inflation which over 27 months reduced the real net 
wage; (iii) the introduction of a new classification system which allowed a well defined career 
path in order to reward ability and skills; (iv) the end of what they called a “war among the 
poor” (rat race) through maximum rebates auctions which has led to falling salaries, increase 
in temporary and unstable contracts, and consequent worsening labor conditions.  
 
On their side, social enterprises replied that fulfilling all these requirements would lead them 
to bankruptcy, since increasing salaries would not allow them to win governmental auctions. 
The issue is complex, since a coordinated reform of classification systems, contracts and 
salaries in the social enterprises carried out at the country level would eliminate the problem 
of wild competition among social enterprises, but would reduce at the same time their 
competitiveness with respect to private firms.  
 
Given the relevance of the topic, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the level of salaries, 
and identify the main determinants of wages and of the probability to be a manager in the 
Italian social enterprises. In order to examine in depth this issue we take into account that 
real wages can be determined only by considering the strong purchasing power (PP) 
disparities among Italian regions. This is why we compare results obtained on nominal wages 




                                                 
3 The so-called gabbie salariali (literally “wage cages”) were a system of setting wages according to some of 
parameters like, for example, the cost of living or the average workers’ productivity in a certain area. This 
system, established by decree in 1946, was initially applied only to Northern Italy. It was only in 1954 that the 
whole country was divided in 14 areas, salaries in the richest regions being up to 29% higher than in poorest. 
Due to the growing opposition by national labor unions, this system was gradually abolished from 1969 and  
replaced in 1972 by national contracts. However, over the last two years the political party Lega Nord (Northern 
Alliance), which defends the interests of Northern Italian regions, has been proposing to introduce again 
regional salaries to take into account the higher cost of living in the North.    5
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. Section 3 presents 




2. Dataset  
 
The dataset used (ICSI 2007) has been built by a pool of six universities
4 in 2006 through 
questionnaires submitted to a representative sample of 4,134 employees and 338 managers 
of more than 300 Italian social enterprises. The sample is stratified by cooperative type, 
province and age. The Survey contains a large set of questions ranging from socio-
demographic controls (age, gender, education, etc.) to economic variables (e.g. wage), from 
job characteristics (tasks, working hours, overtime) to job satisfaction with respect to a 
number of possible domains (with colleagues, wage, type of job). The result is an extremely 
valuable database which enriches our knowledge of the conditions and motivations of 
people employed in the Italian social enterprises. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics of the selected variables for employees and 
managers respectively. Among employees (see Table 1a), around three quarters of the sample 
are made by female workers (consistently with the proportion observed in the Universe of 
social enterprise workers), 29% has a university degree and 5% is foreigner. The average net 
monthly wage (net of taxes, social security contributions, extra pays and bonuses) is 867 € 
(1,012 € for full-time workers), the average annual bonus being negligible. Thus, salaries are 
extremely low
5, especially if one considers the average age and schooling level of people in 
the sample. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the employees’ answers to the question “do 
you consider your gross wage adequate to your education level?” for the employees, the 
answers ranging from 1 (much less than what would be fair) to 7 (much more than what 
would be fair)
6. We can see that the share of dissatisfied individuals exceeds that of satisfied 
ones. 
 
 The average number of working hours is 31 (37 for full-time workers) and paid overtime is 
limited. Three quarters of the sample are members of the cooperative. The average number 
of years spent in the cooperative is 6, ranging from 0 to 36. Temporary contracts are very 
much in use, which confirms the troubles faced by the strikers requesting more stable jobs, 
even if a share of these short-term positions might have been created in newly established 
enterprises and could get stabilized over time. Internships are almost absent. 56% percent of 
individuals are employed full-time, the remaining 44% being part-time. With respect to job 
type, the vast majority (68%) provides services to customers. Almost half of the sample 
respondents work in social enterprises classified as “big” (with more than 49 employees), 
those of type A being the most widespread.  
                                                 
4 Trento, Bergamo, Brescia, Milano Bicocca, Napoli and Reggio Calabria. 
5 The last OECD (2008) report on wages and taxation shows that Italian wages are on average 17% lower than 
the OECD average. In 2008 the average net annual wage of a worker (single and without children) was 21,374 
€ (1,644 € per month considering 13 installments, 1,781 considering 12 installments), taking the 23rd position 
out of 30 countries. Italy’s position slightly improves when considering gross wages, since the fiscal burden has 
been constantly growing over the last years, reaching an impressive average of 46.5% (6th out of 30 positions). 
6 The question has been asked only to employees, not to managers.   6
 
Table 1b reports the sector of activity of the cooperative (more than one choice is allowed). 
The taxonomy for A-type social enterprises includes social assistance, health assistance, 
education assistance, cultural activities, recreation services, or other unspecified businesses. 
The B-type taxonomy includes agriculture and zootechnics, gardening, garbage collection 
(e.g. in parks), manufacture (leather, paper, wood), sales in shops, restaurant and catering 
services, laundry, building, cleaning, and IT/typography/call centers. 
 
Turning to the sample of managers, with respect to employees we can observe higher values 
for the share of males, age, education level and wages. The net monthly wage is 1,071 € 
(1,356 if we exclude volunteers), again a very low figure if we consider the seniority and 
education level of the sample. Figure 2 shows the cumulative distributions of wages of, 
respectively, employees and managers (without considering the volunteers), from the 1
st to 
the 99
th centile. We can see that there are significant differences among income centiles, 
which makes the analysis of the determinants of wages a relevant issue. 
 
 
3. Econometric analysis 
 
The dependent variables under investigation in the econometric analysis are the net monthly 
wage and the net hourly wage, obtained by dividing the monthly wage by the declared 
number of hours worked each month. Since a number of respondents did not declare the 
number of worked hours, it turns out that the number of observations decreases significantly 
when using the hourly instead of the monthly wage. In line with previous studies, we also 
run estimates where the dependent variables are in natural logarithms to correct for the 
pronounced skewness of the data: results are very similar, but wages expressed in absolute 
levels are more intuitive and easier to interpret.   
 
In order to analyze the determinants of wages, we start by adopting a linear specification of 
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where the dependent variable (Y) is regressed on a set of independent variables which 
include a gender dummy (Male), respondent’s age (Age), education years (Education), a 
dummy for Italian nationality (Italian), a dummy which takes value of one if the respondent 
is also member of the cooperative (Member), the number of years of work experience in the 
cooperative (Yearcoop), two dummies for permanent and fulltime job status (Permanent and 
Fulltime respectively), two dummies for medium and large coop size (Medium and Large), a 
dummy which takes value of one if the respondent works in the A-type cooperative (AType) 
and three macroarea dummies (NorthEast, NorthWest and Center). We then move to quantile 
regressions proposed by Konker and Basset (1978), which estimate the coefficients of the   7
determinants of wages along the entire wage distribution and not only at their mean like 
OLS.  
 
OLS regressions are designed to estimate conditional mean models, while quantile 
regressions offer a set of techniques for estimating families of conditional quantile models, 
which provide a better and more complete view of the relationship among variables of 
interest. In our work, we are especially interested in the right tail of the distribution, since 
most of the independent variables are expected to strengthen their effect when salaries 
increase. If some variables were affecting only a part of the wage distribution, by using OLS 
we might get insignificant coefficients. Therefore, relying on quantile regressions is advisable 
and very much in use (see for example the set of studies collected in Fitzenbergen, Koenker 
and Machado, 2002 and the application to the Italian labor market by Naticchioni, Ricci and 
Rustichelli, 2007).  
 
3.1 Results on wage differentials 
 
Table 3a shows OLS regression results for the employees. T-statistics are computed by use 
of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. We can see that the (log of) monthly 
employees’ wage is positively affected by male gender, number of years spent in the 
cooperative, and being a full-time and permanent worker, which is in line with the results on 
the Italian economy as a whole obtained by Lilla (2005) with the SHIW database provided by 
the Bank of Italy.  
 
Education does not display any effect, while Naticchioni, Ricci and Rustichelli (2007) and 
Lilla (2005) using the SHIW database show that, in the Italian economy as a whole, holding a 
university degree has a strong positive impact on wages. Being an Italian citizen has an 
apparently surprising negative correlation with wages (although in regression analyses on 
hourly wages this result will disappear),
7 and jobs which require more skills and imply more 
responsibilities are rewarded with a premium.  
 
In contrast with some previous researches on traditional (for profit) enterprises, firm size 
(large coop and medium coop dummies) does not matter. Many studies have demonstrated the 
positive link between firm size and wage (see, for example, Lester, 1967, Mellow, 1982 and 
Bayard and Troske, 1999), the reasons being that large firms are more capital intensive, more 
productive and pay higher salaries to attract workers of higher quality (see Chuang and Hsu, 
2004). From these results it seems that size does not affect productivity in this kind of 
enterprises, probably due to the type of activities carried on which do not require large 
economies of scale or high specialization. Social enterprises of type B display a negative wage 
differential with respect to those of type A, which is most likely due to the lower 
productivity of the disadvantaged workers employed in the former. The geographical 
location is obviously correlated with wages since Northern Italy is richer than the South. 
 
                                                 
7Descriptive statistics tell us that non Italian workers in our sample are only 5 percent of the total (Table 1). 
They generally either are very specialized workers or, in any case, enjoy of a preferential treatment due to the 
active anti-discrimination policies of many social enterprises. Furthermore, foreign workers are employed in 
activities in which they work significantly more hours so that the difference in remuneration disappears when 
we look at hourly wages.   8
When turning to hourly wages, there are many similarities but also some differences. We find 
a positive effect of male gender, experience in the social enterprise, jobs requiring skills and 
responsibilities, and cooperative of type A. Education still does not display any positive 
effect. However, Italian nationality and having a permanent position are not significant 
anymore. Working full-time implies a negative hourly wage differential (progressive taxation 
surely plays a significant role since higher workload implies higher gross wage but also higher 
marginal rates of contribution) and age has become significant.  
 
Results on gender wage gap are standard in the literature. In fact, males and females have 
different labor market behavior since women are more likely to move from employment to 
nonparticipation because of personal, nonjob-related reasons (e.g., family, pregnancy, health) 
and a longer duration of nonemployment, especially for those exiting to nonparticipation 
(Bowlus, 1997). Nevertheless, gender wage differentials usually persist even after controlling 
for many confounding elements (see Oaxaca, 1973, and Cain, 1986 for early works). 
Furthermore, career interruptions are often the consequence, and not the cause, of low 
wages, as shown by Groanu (1988).  
 
The result on education is in contrast with previous studies. The relationship between 
educational wage premia and the distribution of personal labor earnings is the object of a 
large literature which finds a significant gap between the mean labor earnings of people with 
different schooling levels. Since definition and measurement problems are of paramount 
importance in this kind of studies, they usually focus on the differences in relative wages 
across schooling levels and on the degree of variability, among countries and over time, in 
the pecuniary returns to work, the main issue being the size of the estimated premium, not 
its sign (for a survey see Peracchi, 2006). 
 
To sum up, we highlight two elements in our findings. First, the most interesting results are 
that (i) there is a gender wage gap, (ii) there is no educational wage premium, and (iii) years 
of experience in the cooperative and age are positive and significant. All these factors 
combined together might discourage some young educated females and prevent them from 
applying for a job to social enterprises, since employees’ wages seem to be driven mainly by 
the experience accumulated in the cooperative, without any premium for higher education 
and in presence of gender discrimination. Given that the number of workers in social 
enterprises has been constantly growing, 74% of our sample is female and 29% has a 
university degree, this might be a relevant issue. However, as we will see in what follows 
(section 3.3), education has an indirect positive effect on wages because it increases the 
probability to be a manager. Since promotions have been shown to be important drivers of 
workers’ motivations (Van Herpen et al., 2006), this finding partly counterbalances the 
absence of direct effects of education on wages within the categories of employees and 
managers. 
 
Second, in this paper we do not consider the problem of endogeneity of schooling choices: 
people with higher education level might have more favorable family background and higher 
talent. In order to avoid this omitted variable bias the literature has proposed a number of 
strategies, ranging from instrumental variables techniques to comparisons between siblings 
and twins. Since we do not have the data necessary to solve the problem, we follow Peracchi 
(2006) in distinguishing between returns to education, which is a measure of the causal effect 
of an extra year of schooling on the worker’s earnings, and educational wage premia, which   9
is a measure of statistical association between schooling years and earnings. Our target is 
simply to check whether there is a positive correlation between education and wages. 
 
Table 3b repeats the exercise of Table 3a but adds the sector of activity of the social 
enterprise as additional control. Results do not change. The sector of activity has a 
significant effect on the total wage, but these differences disappear when looking at hourly 
wages, the only exception being represented by those cooperatives working in the IT sector, 




3.2 Correcting for regional PP disparities, quantile regressions and determinants of 
managers’ wages 
 
In Table 4 we replace the nominal self-declared net monthly wage with the real (PPP) 
income. We do so by dividing the previously used nominal wage by an index of cost of living 
for each of the four macro regions considered (North-West, North-East, Center and South). 
The index used is derived from Cannari and Iuzzolino (2009) who calculated the cost of 
living by integrating the information provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics 
(ISTAT) with data from other official sources on other services (e.g. energy, public services, 
transportation etc.) and on real estate prices and rents. This is necessary since, as explained 
by the authors in the introduction (see p. 5), data provided by ISTAT refer to only three 
categories of goods representing around one third of the households’ expenditure: grocery, 
clothing and furniture.  
 
In Table 4 we divide the nominal wages by the average of the 12 indexes provided by the 
authors for the four macro regions in the Appendix 2 (pp. 33-34)
8 and observe that the sign 
of the regional dummy variables is reversed: once corrected for the cost of living, workers in 
the South of Italy receive a higher total and hourly real wage than people employed in the 
Center and in the North. The average real income is around 830 €, thus with respect to 
Southern Italy the negative differential is of 7% for the North-West, 5% for the North-East 
and 9% for the Centre. Given the longstanding debate over the idea of indexing regional 
salaries to the cost of living and average productivity (see footnote 3), this is an interesting 
and relevant finding for the sector of the social enterprises. 
 
Table 5 reports results from quantile regressions for the same equations considered in Table 
3a. The quantiles considered are 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90. Previous findings are confirmed, 
education being never significant. This robustness check shows that the null effect found 
with OLS does not hide a positive contribution for a share of individuals belonging to some 
parts of the wage distribution. 
 
Table 6 repeats the OLS regression analysis for the sample of managers. In this case the 
limited number of observations reduces the number of significant regressors. What we want 
to underline here is that, like before, there is a gender wage differential, education does not 
display any robust effect and experience in the cooperative exerts a positive effect. Table 7, 
                                                 
8 Since all the indexes are highly correlated, dividing the nominal wage by the single indexes provides very 
similar results.   10
confirms with quantile regressions part of conclusions obtained with OLS although, given 
the limited number of observations, results are less stable.  
 
3.3 Probability of becoming a manager 
 
Having studied the determinants of employees and managers’ wages, we turn to investigate 
variables affecting the probability to be a manager in an Italian social enterprise. Table 8a 
shows results from a Probit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 
if the respondent is a manager and 0 otherwise, while Table 8b shows the marginal effects. 
Being a manager is positively associated with male gender, age, education, years of 
experience in the cooperative and having a permanent position, and negatively associated 
with being member of the social enterprise. The relevant results here are that there is again a 
gender wage gap but, interestingly, education plays a role in increasing the probability to be a 
manager.  
 
3.4 The total effect of education  
 
In our study we cannot assume that the choice to be a manager is purely random. 
Furthermore, since education is used a control variable in both the wage and the manager 
regressions, we need to rely on systems of simultaneous equations in order to disentangle the 
effect of education on the two variables and to calculate the total (direct and indirect impact) 
of education on wages. We cannot run a Seemingly Unrelated Regression system, whose 
advantage is that it does not require any exclusion restriction, because the dependent variable 
of the second equation is a dummy variable (equal to one if the respondent is a manager), 
while the model is meant for continuous variables. Thus, Table 9 shows results from 
treatment regressions.  
 
The treatment regression model shown in Table 6 includes the following two equations
9: 
i i i i
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In our system, the first regression refers to the wage while the second to the probability of 
being a manager. In the first equation, controls include all main determinants of wages (each 
system is run once without and once with the respondent’s type of job) while in the second 
equation we add to the standard controls for being a manager also the number of people 
                                                 









ρ σ . The likelihood function for the joint estimation of [2.1] and [2.2] is provided by Maddala (1983) 
and Greene (2003).   11
living in the house (Peopleinhouse) and the number of income perceivers (Nincomearn), which 
are both expected to affect the probability to be a manager but not the wage. The LR test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the two equations are independent: moderate selection bias 
exists and the OLS results may turn out to be unreliable. However treatment regression 
estimates show that our main results (gender, years of experience, job status) hold. Among 
them education keeps on having no direct effect on the wage (there is a negative effect on 
the hourly wage which disappears when using the natural logarithm) and a positive indirect 
effect through the probability of being a manager. The significance of the exclusion 
restriction variable (number of income perceivers) also supports the feasibility of employing 
the Heckman selection method. 
 
We can now calculate the total effect of education. Since being a manager increases average 
sample wage by around 407 € (Table 9, column 1) and an additional year of education with 
respect to the sample mean raises the probability of becoming a manager by 10 percent,  
estimated coefficients tell us that the total effect of an additional year of education is 40.7 € 
more with respect to the benchmark of a cooperative, temporary, part-time, female 
employee working in a B-type cooperative in the South of Italy. 
 
To check the robustness of our results with an approach which does not require exclusion 
restrictions we move to Generalized Linear and Latent Mixed Models (GLLMM), that is “a 
class of multilevel latent variable models for (multivariate) responses of mixed type including 
continuous responses, counts, duration/survival data, dichotomous, ordered and unordered 
categorical responses and rankings” (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004, p. 1).  
 
In our case we have a bivariate setting in which the wage level depends on a series of factors 
which include the manager dummy which is, in turn, endogenous and affected by several 
variables. To this purpose we select within the broad GLLMM class a mixed response 
random effect model (Alfó and Trovato, 2004; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) in which the 
wage (in the first equation) has a Gaussian distribution while the manager dummy (in the 
second equation) follows an ordered Logit specification. This kind of model allows to solve 
the simultaneity effect between worker pay and the managerial / non managerial status. 
 
Results from our GLLMM estimate (see Table 10) show that the main findings are again 
substantially unchanged. Education is significant in the second (probability of becoming a 
manager) while not in the first (wage) equation. All the other variables maintain sign and 
significance of the selection models and the OLS estimates in which the wage regression is 
estimated separately. 
 
To sum up, when considering employees and managers’ wages it emerges that earnings 
depend mainly on the number of years of experience in the cooperative while there is no 
educational wage premium. Talent and skills either are not recognized or are not necessary 
for the type of job done in the cooperative. Gender discrimination is at work. When looking 
at the probability to be a manager, gender discrimination seems to persist, but education 
finally matters. Thus, education does not imply an educational wage premium within each 
category of workers (employees and managers) but raises the probability of an upgrade, 
which implies higher wage and responsibility. 
   12
Not that the total effect of education here is somewhat larger since the effect of education 
on the probability of becoming a manager is larger. Estimated coefficients tell us that the 
total effect of an additional year of education is 164 €. The result depends on the differences 
between the two models. The GLLMM approach estimates individual random effects which 
can have zero mean thereby increasing coefficient values. By comparing results from the two 
models we therefore verify that the statistical significance of the total effect of education is 
robust while, for the economic significance, we conclude that the true value is highly likely to 






Social enterprises are a powerful and effective provider of social services, ranging from 
assistance to the elderly and education services to the children to work integration of 
disadvantaged people. In Italy they hire more than 250,000 people and serve more than three 
million individuals, their number being constantly rising. There are several reasons for this 
impressive growth. First of all, the sensitivity toward the problems of the society has 
increased significantly, spurring a large number of start-up in this sector. Secondly, social 
services provided by the state are insufficient to cover the demand, especially since the 
population is rapidly ageing. Finally, the economic stagnation of the last twenty years and the 
high indebtedness of the Italian Government have pushed the public authorities to 
externalize the provision of social services. 
 
The current situation of Italian social enterprises is made of lights and shadows. The positive 
aspect is the aforementioned success witnessed by the number of workers and people 
served. Unfortunately, our analysis shows the presence of some negative aspects represented 
by the very low average salaries of both workers and managers, which risk to reduce the 
applications from individuals with high talent and skills, when intrinsic motivations are not 
strong enough to compensate for the low pay.  
 
To have a clearer picture of regional real wages we take into account the effect of 
geographical PP disparities in our estimates. By doing so we find that, even though nominal 
salaries are higher in Northern Italy, the South benefits from a positive differential which 
ranges from 4 to 9% with respect to the other three macro-regions considered once we 
correct for the cost of living in the area of residence.  
 
Finally, the presence of gender wage gaps, the absence of education wage premium and the 
strong link between salaries and years spent in the coop seem to depict a scenario where the 
career path is affected by seniority rather than education, with the presence of potential 
gender discriminations. All these elements might constitute a limit for social enterprises 
willing to attract the most talented and motivated individuals.  
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Table 1a: Descriptive statistics (employees) 
                    
Variable  Type  Obs.  Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
            
Male DV  4,082  0.26  0.44  0  1 
Age  Years 3,986 37.38  9.02  17 73 
Education Years  3,759  12.93  3.35  0  21 
University degree  DV  3,759  0.29  0.45  0  1 
Italian DV  4,134  0.95  0.22  0  1 
Wage (monthly)  €  3,744  867  299  100  6,453 
Ln of wage (monthly)  €  3,744 6.70  0.37  4.61  8.77 
Hourly wage  €  2,698  6.70  2.29  1.46  50.00 
Ln of hourly wage  €  2,698  1.87  0.25  0.38  3.91 
Bonus (yearly)  €  4,134  77.20  285  0  6,000 
Hours Number  3,740  31.31  8.66  2  50 
Hours extra  Number  3,092  1.79  3.30  0  30 
Hours total  Number  2,916  32.97  9.62  2  69 
Member DV  4,134  0.76  0.43  0  1 
Years in Coop  Years  3,905  6.21  4.89  0  36 
Permanent DV  4,134  0.80  0.40  0  1 
Temporary DV  4,134  0.18  0.39  0  1 
Internship DV  4,119  0.00  0.06  0  1 
Full time  DV  4,063  0.56  0.50  0  1 
Part time  DV  4,063  0.44  0.50  0  1 
Job 1: Customer care  DV  3,428  0.68  0.47  0  1 
Job 2: Coordinator  DV  3,448  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Job 3: Admin & Finance  DV  3,428  0.06  0.24  0  1 
Job 4: Human resources  DV  3,448  0.01  0.12  0  1 
Job 5: External relations  DV  3,448  0.01  0.08  0  1 
Job 6: Support to service providers DV  3,448 0.11  0.31  0  1 
Job 7: Other  DV  3,448  0.06  0.24  0  1 
Small (<16 workers)  DV  4,134  0.25  0.44  0  1 
Medium coop (16-49 workers)  DV  4,134  0.32  0.46  0  1 
Large coop (>49 workers)  DV  4,134  0.43  0.50  0  1 
Type A  DV  4,134  0.78  0.41  0  1 
North -West  DV  4,134  0.40  0.49  0  1 
North-East DV  4,134  0.22  0.41  0  1 
Centre DV  4,134  0.22  0.41  0  1 
South DV  4,134  0.16  0.37  0  1 
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Note: Answers range from 1 (much less than what would be fair) to 7 (much more than what would be fair) for 




Table 1b: Descriptive statistics (employees' sector of activity) 
                    
Variable Type  Obs.  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
            
Sector A1: Social assistance  DV  4,157  0.53  0.50  0  1 
Sector A2: Health assistance  DV  4,157  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Sector A3: Education assistance  DV  4,157  0.49  0.50  0  1 
Sector A4: Cultural activities  DV  4,157  0.19  0.39  0  1 
Sector A5: Recreation services  DV  4,157  0.33  0.47  0  1 
Sector A6: Other  DV  4,157  0.08  0.26  0  1 
            
Sector B1: Agriculture and zootechnics DV  4,157  0.01  0.12  0  1 
Sector B2: Gardening  DV  4,157  0.12  0.32  0  1 
Sector B3: Garbage collection  DV  4,157  0.08  0.27  0  1 
Sector B4: Manufacture  DV  4,157  0.02  0.14  0  1 
Sector B5: Sales in shops  DV  4,157  0.03  0.16  0  1 
Sector B6: Catering and restaurants  DV  4,157  0.03  0.18  0  1 
Sector B7: Laundry  DV  4,157  0.02  0.15  0  1 
Sector B8: Building  DV  4,157  0.02  0.13  0  1 
Sector B9: Cleaning  DV  4,157  0.09  0.28  0  1 
Sector B10: IT, typography and call center  DV  4,157  0.03  0.17  0  1 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics (managers) 
                    
Variable  Type Obs.  Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
            
Male DV  280  0.53  0.50  0  1 
Age Years  280  45.75  9.61  24  75 
Education Years  280  14.48  2.66  5  21 
University degree  DV  338  0.52  0.50  0  1 
Italian DV  279  1.00  0.06  0  1 
Wage (monthly)  €  280  1,071  709  0  3,400 
Ln of wage (monthly)  €  221  7.14  0.41  5.52  8.13 
Hourly wage  €  156  8.94  2.98  2.84  21.25 
Ln of hourly wage  €  156  2.14  0.32  1.04  3.06 
Bonus (yearly)  €  280  132  317  0  3,600 
Hours Number  221  34.59  7.53  8  55 
Hours extra  Number  156  3.72  5.67  0  30 
Hours total  Number  156  38.49  8.41  16  68 
Member DV  338  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Years in Coop  Years  278  8.20  5.48  0  32 
Permanent DV  221  0.85  0.36  0  1 
Temporary DV  221  0.03  0.16  0  1 
Small (<16 workers)  DV  319  0.45  0.50  0  1 
Medium coop (16-49 workers)  DV  319  0.30  0.46  0  1 
Large coop (>49 workers)  DV  317  0.26  0.44  0  1 
Type A  DV  319  0.71  0.45  0  1 
North -West  DV  335  0.38  0.49  0  1 
North-East DV  335  0.19  0.39  0  1 
Centre DV  335  0.17  0.38  0  1 
South DV  335  0.26  0.44  0  1 
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Table 3a: OLS regressions of employees' monthly wage 
              
Dependent Variable  Wage  Ln of Wage  Hourly Wage  Ln of Hourly Wage 
Male  70.29 0.08  0.31  0.04 
  (7.41) (6.61)  (2.26)  (2.65) 
Age  0.64 0.001  0.01  0.001 
  (1.30) (1.25)  (2.07)  (2.31) 
Education  0.05 0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.04) (0.64)  (-0.23)  (-0.72) 
Italian  -97.36 -0.11 0.02  0.001 
  (-3.36) (-3.51)  (0.13)  (-0.06) 
Member  -8.74 0.001  -0.45  -0.06 
  (-0.89) (-0.10)  (-3.08)  (-3.61) 
Years in Coop  8.20 0.01  0.04  0.01 
  (7.85) (8.00)  (3.53)  (3.98) 
Permanent  53.06 0.08  -0.37  0.001 
  (4.43) (4.41)  (-1.65)  (-0.14) 
Full time  286.86 0.39 -0.53  -0.06 
  (34.22) (33.27)  (-5.01)  (-5.10) 
Job 2: Coordinator  140.33 0.15 1.09  0.14 
  (7.82) (7.53)  (4.83)  (6.02) 
Job 3: Admin & Finance  109.15 0.11 0.65  0.09 
  (6.04) (5.03)  (3.95)  (4.05) 
Job 4: Human resources  151.07 0.15 0.52  0.09 
  (4.12) (3.65)  (2.15)  (2.95) 
Job 5: External relations  150.94 0.16 0.86  0.13 
  (2.70) (3.34)  (2.14)  (2.57) 
Job 6: Support to service providers  -85.38 -0.12  -0.61  -0.09 
  (-6.33) (-5.27)  (-4.06)  (-4.61) 
Job 7: Other  -5.72 -0.03  0.29  0.001 
  (-0.28) (-1.01)  (0.74)  (0.14) 
Medium Coop  10.70 0.02  -0.07  -0.01 
  (0.97) (1.60)  (-0.55)  (-0.74) 
Large Coop  1.90 0.01  -0.09  -0.02 
  (0.17) (0.74)  (-0.57)  (-1.16) 
Type A  54.46 0.08  0.45  0.06 
  (4.77) (4.87)  (2.60)  (3.51) 
North-West  111.39 0.16 0.42  0.08 
  (8.46) (8.31)  (2.86)  (3.95) 
North East  119.56 0.19 0.40  0.07 
  (8.54) (9.24)  (2.42)  (3.44) 
Centre  79.62 0.13  0.47  0.06 
  (5.70) (6.62)  (2.10)  (2.66) 
Constant  508.16 6.16 6.05  1.74 
  (11.72) (110.47)  (14.99)  (33.36) 
N  2,560 2,560  1,888  1,888 
R2  0.49 0.47  0.07  0.09 
Note Results are from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. T-statistics are reported in brackets.   20
 
Table 3b: OLS regressions of employees' monthly wage, with sector of activity 
              
Dependent Variable  Wage  Ln of Wage  Hourly Wage  Ln of Hourly Wage
        
Type A  75.92 0.11  0.95  0.14 
  (4.04) (3.82)  (3.23)  (4.49) 
Sector A2: Health assistance  34.21 0.02  -0.19  -0.02 
  (3.51) (1.82)  (-1.57)  (-1.47) 
Sector A3: Education assistance  -28.54 -0.04  -0.17  -0.02 
  (-2.60) (-2.49)  (-1.24)  (-1.28) 
Sector A4: Cultural activities  -13.26 -0.01  -0.02  0.01 
  (-1.27) (-0.55)  (-0.16)  (0.56) 
Sector A5: Recreation services  -18.20 -0.01  0.13  0.02 
  (-1.81) (-0.92)  (0.90)  (0.98) 
Sector A6: Other  15.78 0.01  -0.18  -0.01 
  (1.04) (0.37)  (-0.91)  (-0.21) 
Sector B2: Gardening  -19.37 -0.06  0.17  0.001 
  (-0.80) (-1.85)  (0.66)  (-0.10) 
Sector B3: Garbage collection  37.08 0.08  0.27  0.07 
  (1.77) (2.56)  (1.26)  (2.37) 
Sector B4: Manufacture  -94.60 -0.12  -0.31  -0.03 
  (-2.70) (-2.29)  (-0.89)  (-0.66) 
Sector B5: Sales in shops  66.71 0.06  0.33  0.05 
  (2.11) (1.74)  (1.16)  (1.36) 
Sector B6: Catering and restaurants  80.55 0.13  0.09  0.04 
  (3.17) (3.56)  (0.41)  (1.06) 
Sector B7: Laundry  27.19 0.05  -0.12  -0.02 
  (1.30) (1.73)  (-0.62)  (-0.63) 
Sector B8: Building  58.94 0.05  0.12  0.04 
  (1.67) (1.33)  (0.44)  (1.01) 
Sector B9: Cleaning  -50.24 -0.05  -0.11  0.001 
  (-2.77) (-2.05)  (-0.52)  (-0.15) 
Sector B10: IT, typography and call center  -11.45 -0.03  0.90  0.11 
  (-0.52) (-0.74)  (2.26)  (2.46) 
              
N  2,560 2,560  1,888  1,888 
R2  0.51 0.49  0.08  0.10 
 
Note: Results are from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. T-statistics are reported in brackets. The 
regressions contain the same identical controls as in Table 3a, plus the sector of activity. The table shows only the coefficients of 
the sector of activity of the cooperative of type A or B. Sectors A1 and B1 are the base to avoid the dummy variable trap. For 








   21
 
Table 4: OLS regressions of employees' monthly real wage (PPP) 
              
Dependent Variable  Wage  Ln of Wage  Hourly Wage  Ln of Hourly Wage 
Male  66.75 0.08  0.31  0.04 
  (7.17) (6.61)  (2.28)  (2.65) 
Age  0.59 0.001  0.01  0.001 
  (1.23) (1.25)  (2.02)  (2.31) 
Education  0.01 0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.01) (0.64)  (-0.40)  (-0.72) 
Italian  -92.80 -0.11  0.01  0.001 
  (-3.44) (-3.51)  (0.09)  (-0.06) 
Member  -8.20 0.001  -0.42  -0.06 
  (-0.86) (-0.10)  (-2.98)  (-3.61) 
Years in Coop  8.31 0.01  0.04  0.01 
  (7.78) (8.00)  (3.38)  (3.98) 
Permanent  51.08 0.08  -0.34  0.001 
  (4.39) (4.41)  (-1.60)  (-0.14) 
Full time  275.68 0.39  -0.51  -0.06 
  (33.89) (33.27)  (-5.06)  (-5.10) 
Job 2: Coordinator  133.45 0.15  1.02  0.14 
  (7.83) (7.53)  (4.83)  (6.02) 
Job 3: Admin & Finance  107.20 0.11  0.62  0.09 
  (6.13) (5.03)  (3.86)  (4.05) 
Job 4: Human resources  133.95 0.15  0.49  0.09 
  (3.73) (3.65)  (2.07)  (2.95) 
Job 5: External relations  159.39 0.16  0.79  0.13 
  (2.84) (3.34)  (2.07)  (2.57) 
Job 6: Support to service providers  -75.90 -0.12  -0.58  -0.09 
  (-5.67) (-5.27)  (-3.92)  (-4.61) 
Job 7: Other  1.59 -0.03  0.27  0.001 
  (0.08) (-1.01)  (0.74)  (0.14) 
Medium Coop  16.95 0.02  -0.06  -0.01 
  (1.56) (1.60)  (-0.49)  (-0.74) 
Large Coop  10.66 0.01  -0.06  -0.02 
  (0.99) (0.74)  (-0.38)  (-1.16) 
Type A  56.18 0.08  0.43  0.06 
  (5.02) (4.87)  (2.58)  (3.51) 
North-West  -59.76 -0.05  -1.02  -0.14 
  (-4.23) (-2.38)  (-6.64)  (-7.01) 
North East  -41.60 -0.01  -0.95  -0.13 
  (-2.81) (-0.56)  (-5.66)  (-6.15) 
Centre  -74.27 -0.06  -0.85  -0.13 
  (-5.00) (-2.92)  (-3.85)  (-5.74) 
Constant  605.06 6.28  6.96  1.86 
  (14.37) (112.70)  (17.34)  (35.74) 
N  2,560 2,560  1,888  1,888 
R2  0.48 0.46  0.10  0.14 
 
Note: Results are from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. T-statistics are reported in brackets. 
The regressors are the same as in Table 3a, but the dependent variable is the real wage, given by the nominal wage divided by an 
index of the cost of living for each of the four macro regions considered. For variable legend see section 3. 
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Table 5: Quantile regressions of employees’ wage, selected coefficients 
                 
Quantile  Dependent Variable  Wage  Ln of Wage  Hourly Wage  Ln of H. Wage 
q10  Male 53.35  0.07  0.03  0.01 
   (4.20)  (3.34)  (0.24)  (0.32) 
 Education  -0.57 0.001  -0.02  0.001 
   (-0.34)  (-0.39)  (-1.33)  (-1.37) 
  Years in Coop  5.87  0.01  0.02  0.001 
   (4.17)  (3.21)  (1.18)  (1.19) 
  Permanent 75.95  0.13  0.41  0.09 
      (4.93)  (5.17)  (3.09)  (3.37) 
q25  Male 52.93  0.06  0.11  0.02 
   (5.33)  (4.57)  (1.66)  (1.55) 
 Education  -0.87 0.001  -0.01  0.001 
   (-0.70)  (-0.19)  (-0.99)  (-1.23) 
  Years in Coop  6.93  0.01  0.04  0.01 
   (6.45)  (6.25)  (5.53)  (5.58) 
  Permanent 60.98  0.11  0.26  0.05 
      (5.06)  (6.61)  (3.26)  (3.79) 
q50  Male 57.93  0.06  0.24  0.04 
   (6.62)  (4.73)  (3.19)  (3.37) 
 Education  0.70  0.001  -0.01  0.001 
   (0.64)  (0.10)  (-1.08)  (-1.15) 
  Years in Coop  8.47  0.01  0.05  0.01 
   (9.23)  (6.69)  (6.02)  (6.96) 
  Permanent 43.00  0.05  0.12  0.02 
      (4.11)  (3.46)  (1.37)  (1.48) 
q75  Male 69.68  0.07  0.19  0.03 
   (6.01)  (6.60)  (2.35)  (2.38) 
 Education  0.73  0.001  0.001  0.001 
   (0.50)  (0.23)  (-0.48)  (-0.30) 
  Years in Coop  9.02  0.01  0.04  0.01 
   (7.30)  (8.02)  (4.22)  (4.32) 
  Permanent 51.90  0.06  -0.14  -0.02 
      (3.66)  (4.62)  (-1.35)  (-1.41) 
q90  Male 110.14  0.10  0.55  0.07 
   (5.92)  (6.30)  (3.29)  (3.44) 
 Education  2.05  0.001  0.01  0.001 
   (0.85)  (0.81)  (0.62)  (0.41) 
  Years in Coop  5.80  0.01  0.04  0.01 
   (2.82)  (2.77)  (2.39)  (2.33) 
  Permanent 47.84  0.06  -0.60  -0.07 
      (2.07)  (3.13)  (-2.92)  (-2.63) 
 
Note: Results are from quantile regressions with the same control variables as in Table 2. For reasons of space only 
coefficients and heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics (in brackets) of selected variables are shown. For variable 
legend see section 3. 
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Table 6: OLS regressions of managers' monthly wage 
              
Dependent Variable  Wage  Ln of Wage  Hourly Wage 
Ln of Hourly 
Wage 
        
Male  266.98 0.20  1.31  0.15 
  (4.32) (3.83) (2.65)  (2.79) 
Age  2.41 0.001 0.02  0.001 
  (0.45) (-0.08) (0.38)  (-0.07) 
Education  22.16 0.01  0.17  0.02 
 (1.60)  (1.20)  (1.74)  (1.52) 
Years in Coop  15.30 0.01  0.10  0.01 
  (1.97) (1.63) (1.68)  (1.70) 
Permanent  145.90 0.12  0.30  -0.01 
  (1.38) (1.28) (0.41)  (-0.06) 
Administrator  -28.48 -0.08  1.29  0.06 
  (-0.09) (-0.32) (0.54)  (0.30) 
Member  59.09 0.03  0.13  0.001 
  (0.98) (0.56) (0.28)  (-0.03) 
Medium Coop  -6.54 -0.03 0.24  0.02 
  (-0.08) (-0.37) (0.37)  (0.22) 
Large Coop  205.82 0.18  0.67  0.10 
  (2.48) (2.60) (1.05)  (1.39) 
Type A  59.50 0.03  0.19  -0.01 
  (0.79) (0.55) (0.34)  (-0.23) 
North-West  255.56 0.22  1.46  0.17 
  (2.82) (2.79) (2.31)  (2.42) 
North East  277.57 0.25  1.18  0.14 
  (2.75) (3.02) (1.52)  (1.47) 
Centre  190.39 0.16  1.35  0.15 
  (1.72) (1.67) (1.53)  (1.65) 
Constant  220.96 6.41  2.38  1.58 
 (0.54)  (21.04)  (0.81)  (5.16) 
              
N  214 214 152  152 
R2  0.25 0.21 0.20  0.20 
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Table 7: Quantile regressions of managers' wage, selected coefficients 
                 
Quantile  Dependent Variable  Wage  Ln of Wage  Hourly Wage  Ln of H. Wage 
q10  Male 251.89  0.30  1.11  0.16 
   (1.55)  (1.47)  (1.19)  (0.96) 
 Education  25.45  0.02  0.33  0.05 
   (0.78)  (0.41)  (1.17)  (0.96) 
  Years in Coop  9.69  0.01  -0.01  0.001 
   (0.60)  (0.40)  (-0.16)  (-0.22) 
  Permanent 187.25  0.24  1.19  0.22 
      (0.72)  (0.82)  (1.14)  (1.15) 
q25  Male 113.96  0.11  1.36  0.21 
   (1.40)  (1.44)  (3.12)  (5.42) 
 Education  4.25  0.001  0.14  0.02 
   (0.26)  (0.28)  (1.39)  (2.49) 
  Years in Coop  10.67  0.01  0.07  0.01 
   (1.31)  (1.05)  (1.52)  (2.23) 
  Permanent 333.50  0.39  0.04  0.001 
      (2.67)  (3.21)  (0.04)  (-0.01) 
q50  Male 247.98  0.19  1.10  0.12 
   (3.27)  (3.43)  (1.71)  (1.76) 
 Education  5.24  0.001  0.12  0.01 
   (0.34)  (0.11)  (0.95)  (0.81) 
  Years in Coop  21.90  0.01  0.09  0.01 
   (2.69)  (2.24)  (1.25)  (1.25) 
  Permanent 53.43  0.02  -0.15  -0.03 
      (0.41)  (0.21)  (-0.12)  (-0.25) 
q75  Male 259.15  0.16  1.14  0.11 
   (3.40)  (2.81)  (1.67)  (1.53) 
 Education  17.74  0.01  0.15  0.02 
   (1.12)  (0.82)  (1.15)  (1.28) 
  Years in Coop  18.19  0.01  0.12  0.01 
   (2.15)  (1.57)  (1.64)  (1.07) 
  Permanent -98.78  -0.05  -1.07  -0.08 
      (-0.72)  (-0.47)  (-0.80)  (-0.54) 
q90  Male 368.87  0.18  1.39  0.10 
   (3.04)  (2.75)  (0.55)  (0.52) 
 Education  49.37  0.02  0.30  0.02 
   (1.87)  (1.49)  (0.71)  (0.74) 
  Years in Coop  11.88  0.01  0.21  0.02 
   (0.91)  (1.04)  (0.76)  (0.83) 
  Permanent 104.64  0.04  -0.54  -0.05 
      (0.52)  (0.63)  (-0.19)  (-0.24) 
 
Note: Results are from quantile regressions with the same control variables as in Table 5. For reasons of space only 
coefficients and heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics (in brackets) of selected variables are shown. For variable legend see 
section 3. 
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Table 8a: Probit regression for the probability of being manager 
                       
Variable    Coef. Std.  Err.  z  P>z [95%  Conf.  Interval] 
                       
Male   0.59 0.08  7.29  0  0.43  0.75 
Age   0.04  0.001  10.99  0  0.04  0.05 
Education   0.10 0.01  7.35  0  0.07  0.12 
Member   -0.72 0.09  -8.2  0  -0.90  -0.55 
Years in Coop   0.02 0.01  2.58  0.01 0.001  0.03 
Permanent   0.31 0.11  2.71  0.007 0.09  0.53 
Medium Coop   -0.32 0.10  -3.24  0.001 -0.51  -0.13 
Large Coop   -0.36 0.10  -3.59  0  -0.56  -0.16 
Type A   0.19 0.10  1.91  0.056 -0.01  0.39 
North-West   0.06 0.12  0.52  0.606 -0.17  0.28 
North East   0.001 0.13  0.01  0.992  -0.26  0.26 
Centre   0.01 0.13  0.07  0.947 -0.24  0.26 
Constant   -4.74 0.28  -16.71 0  -5.29  -4.18 
                       
N   3,664           
Pseudo R2     0.21                
             
             
Table 8b: Marginal effects          
                       
Variable  dy/dx  Std. Err.  z  P>z  [    95% C.I.   ]  X 
             
Male*  0.05 0.01  5.87  0  0.03  0.07  0.27 
Age  0.001 0.001  8.88  0  0.001  0.001  37.62 
Education  0.01 0.00  6.97  0 0.001  0.01  13.04 
Member*  -0.07 0.01  -6.52  0  -0.08  -0.05  0.74 
Years in Coop  0.00 0.00  2.66  0.008  0.00  0.00  6.21 
Permanent*  0.02 0.01  3.12  0.002  0.01  0.03  0.81 
Medium Coop*  -0.02 0.01  -3.54  0  -0.03  -0.01  0.32 
Large Coop*  -0.02 0.01  -3.67  0  -0.03  -0.01  0.42 
Type A*  0.01 0.01  2.15  0.032  0.00  0.02  0.77 
North-West*  0.001 0.01  0.51 0.609  -0.01  0.02  0.41 
North East*  0.001 0.01  0.01 0.992  -0.02  0.02  0.19 
Centre*  0.001 0.01  0.07 0.947  -0.02  0.02  0.22 
                       
 
Note: The dependent variable of the Probit regression is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is a 
manager, which is the case for 7.5% of the sample.  
* dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.For variable legend see section 3.    26
Table 9: Treatment regressions   
                              
Equation 1     Wage    Ln of Wage    Hourly Wage    Ln of H. Wage 
Male   94.11 93.72  0.09  0.09  0.27  0.34  0.05 0.06 
   (9.35) (8.97)  (7.81) (7.07)  (2.40) (2.71)  (3.98)  (3.99) 
Age   -0.28 0.11  0.001  0.001  -0.01  -0.01 0.001  0.001 
   (-0.52) (0.20)  (-0.72) (0.03)  (-1.53) (-0.90)  (-0.12)  (-0.01) 
Education   0.22 0.17  0.001  0.001  -0.03  -0.03  0.001  0.001 
   (0.17) (0.13)  (0.67) (0.58)  (-1.92) (-2.01)  (-1.19)  (-1.43) 
Italian   -61.14 -66.38  -0.07  -0.06  0.15  0.16  0.02 0.02 
   (-2.71) (-2.85)  (-2.54) (-2.24)  (0.60) (0.60)  (0.63)  (0.70) 
Member   3.29 -5.37  0.01 0.001  -0.33  -0.43 -0.04  -0.04 
   (0.31) (-0.49)  (0.92) (0.24)  (-3.02) (-3.61)  (-3.34)  (-3.21) 
Years in Coop    10.84 11.09  0.01  0.01  0.05  0.06  0.01 0.01 
   (10.61) (10.62)  (10.001) (8.85)  (4.59) (5.01)  (5.89)  (5.82) 
Permanent   62.08 63.51  0.09  0.10  -0.23  -0.32 0.001  0.001 
   (5.06) (4.97)  (6.49) (6.05)  (-1.72) (-2.16)  (0.001)  (-0.11) 
Full time    286.29 287.58  0.39  0.39  -0.46  -0.50  -0.05 -0.06 
    (31.34) (30.74)  (36.35) (33.15) (-4.64)  (-4.57)  (-4.60)  (-4.83) 
Manager   406.72 469.20  0.33  0.40  5.34  5.73  0.44  0.48 
   (12.61)  (13.08)  (6.61)  (7.01) (23.41)  (19.30)  (9.20)  (8.67) 
Constant   455.50 457.39  6.14  6.13  6.53  6.54  1.75  1.76 
   (12.10)  (11.75)  (137.19)  (125.06) (15.82)  (14.51)  (38.05)  (34.45) 
DVs for type of job   No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
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(Cont.) 
 
Equation 2     Manager     Manager     Manager     Manager 
Male   0.54 0.58    0.53  0.56    0.44 0.49    0.54  0.59 
   (6.84) (6.27)    (6.74)  (6.16)    (5.25) (5.04)    (5.88)  (5.51) 
Age   0.04 0.04    0.04  0.04    0.03 0.03    0.04  0.04 
   (8.91) (7.26)    (8.76)  (7.15)    (6.74) (5.23)    (7.54)  (6.08) 
Education   0.10 0.10    0.10  0.10    0.09 0.10    0.11  0.12 
   (7.18) (6.02)    (7.19)  (6.05)    (6.09) (5.29)    (6.55)  (6.06) 
Years in Coop    0.01 0.01    0.01  0.01    0.01 0.01    0.01  0.01 
   (1.18)  (0.72)    (1.09)  (0.61)   (0.98)  (0.97)  (0.89)  (0.68) 
People in the house    0.14 0.18    0.14  0.18    0.19 0.24    0.17  0.22 
   (3.67) (4.03)    (3.65)  (4.06)    (5.60) (6.11)    (3.96)  (4.36) 
Income perceivers    0.02 0.01    0.01  0.01    0.02 0.04    0.02  0.02 
   (0.38) (0.23)    (0.29)  (0.16)    (0.38) (0.66)    (0.44)  (0.28) 
Constant   -4.88 -4.96    -4.84  -4.92    -4.32 -4.42    -5.02  -5.30 
      (-16.93)  (-14.22)     (-16.87)  (-14.21)     (-13.38)  (-11.12)     (-14.58)  (-12.36) 
Rho   -0.13 -0.12    -0.17  -0.18    -0.72 -0.75    -0.35  -0.38 
LR indep. of eq. (P-value)    0.02 0.03    0.08  0.06    0.001 0.00    0.00  0.00 
N   3,332 2,735    3,332  2,735    2,475 2,020    2,475  2,020 
Log L.     -23,659  -19,155     -1,159  -859     -5,979  -4,791     -550  -395 
 
Note: Results are from treatment regressions where the dependent variable of the first equation is one of the four variables for wage and that of the second is the dummy 
variable for being a manager. In the wage equation, all regressions include dummy variables for cooperative size (medium and large) and type (type A), and for macro region 
(NW, NE and Centre). Results are consistent with previous findings and are not shown for reasons of space, but are available upon request. Every system is run once with and 
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Table 10: GLLMM simultaneous model 
        
Regressor Coeff.  Z-Value 
    
Equation 1: Determinants of net monthly wage    
    
Constant 438.87  11.83 
Male 99.04  10.04 
Age 0.05  0.09 
Italian -61.36  -2.72 
Member 3.20  0.31 
Years in Coop  10.95  10.74 
Permanent 61.17  4.99 
Manager 338.80  18.11 
Education 0.78  0.62 
Full time  286.23  31.33 
Medium Coop  2.33  0.20 
Large Coop  12.87  1.11 
A Type  61.07  5.65 
North-West 135.13  10.27 
North-East 143.72  9.70 
Centre 102.20  7.05 
        
Regressor Coeff.  Z-Value 
    
Equation 2: Determinants of being a manager   
    
Constant -24.36  -3.56 
Male 2.52  3.49 
Age 0.20  3.21 
Education 0.49  3.37 
Years in Coop  0.04  1.19 
People in the House  0.51  2.51 
Nr. Income Perceivers  0.17  0.74 
        
 
Note: Results are from GLLMM simultaneous model where the dependent variable 
of the first equation is the nominal self-declared net monthly wage, net of taxes, 
social security contributions, extra pays and bonuses. 
 
 